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SHOULD ISSUERS BE ON THE HOOK FOR LADDERING?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IPO MARKET
MANIPULATION LITIGATION
Stephenj. Choi" andA. C Pritchardr"

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 6, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story
exposing abuses in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs).' The
story revealed "tie-in" agreements between investment banks and initial
investors seeking to participate in "hot" offerings.2 Under those agreements, initial investors would commit to buy additional shares of the
offering company's stock in secondary market trading in return for
allocations of shares in the IPO.3 As the Wall StreetJournalrelated, those
"[c]ommitments to buy in the after-market lock in demand for additional stock at levels above the IPO price. As such, they provide the
rocket fuel that sometimes boosts IPO prices into orbit on the first
trading day." 4 This process of encouraging purchases in the aftermarket
at ever-higher prices has come to be known as "laddering." This Article
presents a study of the role and extent of culpability of issuers of stock in
such laddering schemes.
The Journal's account of the practice essentially lays out a conspiracy
between underwriters and their favored investor-customers to engage in
a scheme of market manipulation.5 Retail investors--who end up
purchasing the stock after the IPO at inflated prices--systematically lose
from the manipulation.
*
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1. Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, SeekingIPOShares, Investors Offer to Buy More inAfer-Market, WALL
ST.J., Dec. 6, 2000 at Al.
2. Offerings are described as "hot" if the demand for shares is likely to exceed supply.
3. Pulliam & Smith, supra note 1.
4. Id
5. TheJournal story was the watershed event for this scandal, but not the first public discussion. The
SEC's Division of Market Regulation had warned earlier that year that "tie-in" agreements were "prohibited
by Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M, and may violate other anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions
of the federal securities laws." Staff Legal Bulletin, Division of Market Regulation No. 10, Prohibited
Solicitations and "Tie-In" Agreements for Aftermarket Purchases (Aug. 25, 2000).
**
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What benefits do underwriters receive from boosting the IPO price?
At first glance, the clear winners from a hot IPO are those initial
investors who purchase at the IPO offering price, typically large institutional investors. Underwriters may then benefit in a number of indirect
ways. First, underwriters of firm commitment offerings (under which
the underwriters bear the risk of failing to sell out the offering) reduce
their risk. Investors are more willing to purchase IPO shares if they
expect immediate gains in the stock price in the secondary market.
Second, underwriters gain a reputational benefit. By elevating the aftermarket price above the IPO price, underwriters allow their customersthe institutional IPO investors-to sell their overvalued stock to retail
investors in the aftermarket. A drop in stock price before the institutional investors sell their IPO allotments into the secondary market
would damage the underwriters' IPO reputations among the institutional investors. Among the services underwriters provide to issuers is
their ability, based on the underwriters' reputations, to bring investors
willing to buy the IPO stock. Laddering therefore may enhance the
underwriters' ability to charge higher fees from subsequent issuers.
Third-and less benign from the issuer's perspective-underwriters may
obtain under-the-table commissions from favored investor-clients. In a
follow-up story on the laddering scheme, the Journalreported a joint
investigation into the allegations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York.6 That story pointed to underwriters demanding commissions from investors favored with hot IPO allocations: "Wall Street
dealers may have sought and obtained larger-than-typical trading commissions in return for giving coveted allocations of IPOs to certain
investors." 7
To the extent laddering (and the promises of some investors to direct
more trading commissions to underwriters) represents hidden kickbacks,
the IPO prospectus may be materially misleading in omitting such
information. Prospectuses, the disclosure documents provided to IPO
investors, must explain the commissions and fees being charged for the
offering. The payments to underwriters-indirectly through laddering
-could amount to extra undisclosed underwriting fees.

6. Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, US Probes Inflated Commissionsfor Hot IPOs, WALL ST.J., Dec.
7, 2000, at C 1.
7. Id While this Article was in the editing process, the SEC proposed a series of modifications to
Regulation M governing, among others, the activities of underwriters in the public offering process. The
SEC proposed to prohibit underwriters from using greater allocations of IPO shares as an inducement to
obtain higher trading commissions on unrelated transactions (or other indirect forms of compensation) from
favored investors. See Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes IPO Allocation Reforms (Oct.
13, 2004), availahle at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-145.htm.
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Not surprisingly, the fallout from these revelations has been severe for
the investment banking industry. The SEC's investigation into the
practice led, so far, to settlements with Credit Suisse First Boston ($100
million), Goldman Sachs ($40 million), Morgan Stanley ($40 million),
Robertson Stephens ($28 million) andJ.P. Morgan ($25 million).' The
magnitude of these fines suggests that the SEC was able to uncover substantial evidence of the laddering scheme. The National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) has proposed rules to try and dampen the
frothy IPO aftermarket that makes such abuses possible. The rules
would, among other things, ban market orders on the first day of trading
after the IPO.9
Potentially far more damaging to the underwriters than SEC enforcement or rule changes is the deluge of class action lawsuits that followed
in the wake of the laddering revelations. In the year after the Journal's
stories, plaintiffs' lawyers filed suits alleging fraud in connection with 309
IPOs that debuted between 1998 and 2000. Those suits have been
consolidated into a single proceeding in the Southern District of New
York."° After the investment banks' motion to dismiss was rejected,
commentators warned, "Ifthey lose, damages could be in the billions." 1
Few tears will be shed for the investment bankers. They appear to
have been caught being overly aggressive in their efforts to separate
"fools" (the retail investors who eventually end up holding overvalued
shares) from their money. Perhaps more sympathy can be mustered,
however, for the issuers who have been caught up in the fallout from this
scandal. Underwriting firms may have deliberately priced offerings
below the level justified by market demand in order to better extract
kickbacks from the IPO initial investors. The scheme alleged in the

8. Randall Smith & Susan Craig, Finns Close in on Settlement of IPO Inquit,, WALL ST.J.,June 22,
2004, at C 1; SEC Sues CSFB for IPO Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, SEC Litigation Release No.
17,327 (Jan. 22, 2002), avail.able at http://www.sec.gov/tigation/fitreleases/lr17327.htm; SEC Sues
Robertson Stephens, Inc. for Profit Sharing in Connection with Initial Public Offerings; Robertson Stephens,
Inc. Consents to Pay $28 Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 17,923 (January 9, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7923.htm; SEC SuesJ.P. Morgan Securities Inc. for Unlawful
IPO Allocation Practices; .J.P. Morgan Agrees to Settlement Calling for Injunction and Payment of $25
Million Penalty, SEC Litigation Release No. 18,385 (October 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
fitigation/litreleases/r 18385.htm.
9. Raymond Hennessey& Phyllis Plitch, IPOMarket May FaceRestrtion, WALL ST.J. Jan. 12, 2004,
at C4. The SEC's proposed modifications to Regulation M, discussed supra note 7, would also increase the
"restricted period" beyond the present 5-day period "during which distribution participants must refrain
from activity that could stimulate the market for the security in distribution." Securities and Exchange
Commission, supra note 7.
10. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A parallel suit
against the underwriters alleging antitrust violations was dismissed. Jonathan Stempel,Juedge Tosses IPO Suits
Against 10 Banks, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2003.
11. Jake Keaveny & Gail Appleson, Judge Re'ects Effort to Dismiss Lawsuit Oer Initial Offerings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at C5.
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laddering lawsuits therefore provides one
potential answer to the long2
standing puzzle of IPO underpricing.1
Greater underpricing transfers value from the issuer to the initial
investors, compensating the investors for the risk involved in purchasing
shares in the after market at overinflated prices as part of the laddering
scheme (e.g., the risk that the market price may collapse before the
investors are able to sell the shares they purchase in the aftermarket).
The transfer of value also compensates investors (with the issuer's
money) for directing higher trading commissions to the underwriters in
later transactions. IPO issuers acquiesce in this general pattern of
underpricing, presumably because they are at an informational or
bargaining disadvantage relative to the underwriters who are privy to
the market demand for the IPO shares. Underpricing may therefore
provide underwriters a hidden means to siphon greater commissions
indirectly from the issuer. This explanation suggests that issuers, together with retail investors, are the principal victims of laddering schemes;
if IPOs were priced to reflect demand more accurately they would
generate more capital for the firm. 3 Nonetheless, the issuers have been
named as co-defendants in the suits.
The IPO laddering complaints allege that the failure to disclose the
aftermarket trading scheme in the section of the registration statement
relating to underwriter compensation violated both Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")'4 and Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 5 Section 11 creates
the greatest risk of liability for the issuer-defendants. 6 Under Section
11, issuers making public offerings of securities are strictly liable to investors for any material misstatements in the registration statements that

12. IPO underpricing refers to the large first-day returns many IPOs experience systematically,
suggesting that the IPOs are underpriced relative to the valuation in the market. For evidence of
underpricing, see RogerG. Ibbotson, Price Performance ofCommon StockNew Issues, 2J. FIN. ECON. 235 (1975);
Jay R. Ritter, The "HotIssue" Market of1980, 57J. Bus. 215 (1984); Clifford W. Smith,Jr., Investment Banking
and the CapitalAcquisitionProcess, 15J. FIN. EcON. 3 (1986). Other theories exist to explain underpricing. See
Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offenngs of Common Stock 43 J. FtN. 789, 790 (1988) (arguing that
underpricing reduces the exposure of issuers to legal liability). Our sample, in contrast, provides evidence
that those issuers with the greatest amount of underpricing are significantly more likely to face suit.
13. This possibility raises the question ofwhy issuers do not rely on Dutch auctions to sell their shares
in IPOs, which would effectively eliminate underpricing. W.R. Hanbrecht & Co. has promoted the Dutch
auction alternative for a number of years, but so far has achieved little market penetration. The question
ofwhy issuers have not opted for Dutch auctions is beyond the scope of this article.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
15. Id § 78j(b). The IPO laddering complaints can be found on the Web at http://www.iposecurities
litigation.com (visited onJanuary 30, 2004).
16. Although perhaps not the greatest damages exposure because Section 11 limits damages to the
offering amount. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (g). Section 10(b) claims are not similarly limited although
they are more difficult to plead and prove. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b).
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accompany those offers. 7 The district court, unsurprisingly, rejected the
issuer-defendants' argument that they could not be held liable under
Section 11 because they were unaware of the laddering practice. 8 After
their motion to dismiss was in large part rejected, the issuers entered
into a settlement
with the plaintiffs, guaranteeing at least a $1 billion
9
recovery. 1
We do not quarrel with the district court's reading of Section 11; the
provision sweeps broadly, making issuer knowledge and culpability
irrelevant. The issuers' liability exposure nonetheless raises a substantial
policy question: Should issuers be liable for wrongdoing by underwriters in the distribution process for public offerings even where the
issuers themselves are not culpable for (and do not benefit from) the
laddering scheme?2 ° If one thinks that some liability is appropriate, does
it make sense to impose strict liability on issuers for the conduct of
underwriters? Or would a scienter standard, or at least a negligence
standard (in the form of a due diligence defense), be more appropriate
for misrepresentations in this context? From a deterrence perspective,
liability only makes sense if the defendant is positioned to avoid the
harm in the first place.
Are issuers well placed to detect misrepresentations relating to the
distribution process?
Our study attempts to shed light on the culpability of the issuers
caught up in the laddering scheme. We study a random sample of the
defendant issuers, matched with similar firms that conducted IPOs
during the same period but who were not named as defendants in the
laddering litigation. To summarize our central findings, we find no
systematic evidence that the sued firms were more likely to have
engaged in fraud.
So what? Why should we care if the issuer-defendants are not in fact
culpable for the underwriters' efforts to engage in laddering (and indeed
may have been harmed by underpricing)? At stake is the more general
question of when third parties should be held liable for the wrongdoing

17. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 6(a), 1 l(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77fga), 77k(a)(1).
18. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Utig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
19. To be sure, this averages out to a little more than $3 million per issuer, so the overall impact on
the sued firms is not very substantial. One speculates, however, that the firms that failed to get the Section
10(b) claims against them dismissed, see infia text accompanying notes 30-35, may have contributed
significantly more than the average firm.
20. Of course, ifladdering permanently raised stock prices, the issuer would benefit. At the very least,
the issuer could sell subsequent equity offerings at a higher price. To the extent laddering pushes a
company's price above its true, fundamental value, we are doubtful that the overinflated valuation will
continue indefinitely. As new information on the company comes to light (through SEC periodic disclosure
filings, for example), the market eventually will readjust the price of the company toward its fundamental
value.

184

UNIVERSITY OF CLMCLYNA TIM WREVIEW

[Vol. 73

of others under the securities laws. Section lI's liability scheme enlists
underwriters, auditors, and others involved in public offerings as
monitors of the issuer's disclosures for fraud. The regime does not, however, make underwriters, auditors, and other third parties insurers
against fraud (as they would be under strict liability). Instead, Section
11 affords a due diligence defense to third parties." The due diligence
defense strikes a balance by enlisting third parties to monitor the issuer
-acting as gatekeepers-but it protects them from liability for conduct
beyond their knowledge and control.22 Drafting third parties as
gatekeepers makes little sense if the third parties cannot limit the actions
of the primary wrongdoer. 3 Imposing liability on third parties in such
circumstances would simply induce third parties to raise their fees (with
no offsetting benefit). The net effect would be to raise the overall cost
of capital.
The laddering litigation turns the original scope of Section 11 on its
head. Instead of underwriters bearing responsibility for the wrongdoings of the issuers, now issuers bear liability for the wrongdoings of the
underwriters. The critical difference, however, is that the present structure of Section 11 does not afford issuers the due diligence defense provided to underwriters and other third parties. But if the issuer truly is
not culpable, forcing the issuer to act as an insurer for the underwriter
will raise the cost of capital without any corresponding social gain from
enhanced deterrence.24
We proceed as follows. Part II develops a series of hypotheses
relating to the plaintiffs' choice of defendants and the issuers' culpability
in the laddering scheme. Part III describes our sample and presents
descriptive statistics comparing the firms sued in that litigation with
firms that avoided suit. Part IV presents the main findings of our multivariate regressions. Part V concludes by discussing potential policy
implications of our findings for the scope of liability under Section 11.

21.

See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (b)(3). The due diligence defense is not available for the issuer. See

id
22. The due diligence defense allows a Section II defendant (other than the issuer) to avoid liability
if it meets the burden of showing that the defendant had "reasonable ground to believe and did believe" in
the truth ofthe misleading statement. In certain circumstances, the defendant must also make a "reasonable
investigation" as to the truthfulness of the statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § I 1(b)(3).
23. Liability might make sense if the third party could diversify the risk more cheaply than investors.
That seems unlikely given the trivial costs to investors of diversification.
24. This effect may be mitigated if issuers can seek contribution from the underwriters. It is not
eliminated, however, as the SEC takes the position that indemnification agreements are void as violating
public policy. Even if indemnification were permissible, issuers would still face very substantial litigation
costs.
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Did the plaintiffs' lawyers sue the issuer-defendants based on evidence
of their involvement in the laddering scheme? Or was the issuers' role
irrelevant to the plaintiffs' filing decisions? To shed light on this question, we develop a series of hypotheses, relying on the allegations found
in the lawsuit and the court's decision on the issuers' motion to dismiss.
We also look to prior work studying the determinants of securities fraud
class action filings in developing our hypotheses.
Our first hypothesis is fairly obvious. The main focus of the laddering
lawsuit is the conduct of the underwriters. Did the plaintiffs choose
which issuers to sue based on the issuers' choice of underwriter?
Hypothesis 1: Issuers were sued basedon their choice of underwriter.
Even if underwriter choice played a role in the selection of issuers to
sue, it seems unlikely that all issuers associated with the underwriters
engaged in laddering practices were sued. Prior studies of securities
fraud litigation show that factors relating to potential damages from
litigation are an important factor influencing the decision to sue.
Plaintiffs' attorneys will not bring claims that, even if successful, offer the
attorneys an insufficient return to cover the costs of litigation. Because
the claims against the issuers included purchases in the secondary
market, factors relating to "fraud on the market" damages are likely to
weigh heavily in the plaintiffs' lawyers' decision to name an issuer in the
suit. Prior work has found that share turnover and market capitalization
(both related to the size of potential damages under Rule I Ob-5)2 5 are
26
important determinants in the decision to sue.
Hypothesis 2: Suedfirms will have greaterpotential damages.
The nature of the market manipulation scheme alleged is also likely
to have influenced the choice of issuers to sue. The most obvious possibility is that the plaintiffs' attorneys selected the issuers whose firms had
the biggest "pop" on the first trading day after their IPO. A large price

25. The SEC promulgated Rule 1Ob-5 under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Se Securities
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b).
26. See, e.g., MARILYN F.JOHNSON ET AL., Do THE MERITS MATTER MORE? CLASS ACTIONS
UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT (University of Michigan Law School John
M. Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 02-011, 2003), available at
http://w-ww.law.umich.edu/CentersAndPrograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2002/johnson%/*20
%Nelson%20Pritchard%2002011 .pdf.
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gain helps plaintiffs to tell a persuasive story of market manipulation by
the underwriters and their customers (i.e., the large gain is due to the
manipulation). A large gain is also likely to correlate with large damages." It does little, however, to make a case for issuer culpability. A
large price gain on the first day suggests that issuers have left substantial
sums of money on the table. Pricing the offering higher would28 have
produced much larger proceeds from the offering for the issuer.
Hypothesis 3: Sued issuers will have greaterfirst-day returns.
Closely connected to the allegation of inflated first-day returns is the
plaintiffs' contention that the investment banks implicated in the scheme
gave a further boost to the stock price of the issuers by issuing biased
research reports-"booster shots"-immediately after the expiration of
the quiet period for the offering (25 calendar days after the IPO where
the securities are listed on an exchange or NASDAQ).29 Such booster
shots may have provided support to the stock price, allowing the initial
profitably to
institutional investors that assisted in the laddering scheme
30
investors.
retail
of
expense
the
at
holdings
their
out
cash
Hypothesis 4: Suedfirms will have greaterreturns immediateyl after the expiration
of the quietperiod.
The artificial inflation allegedly created by the laddering scheme also
leads to our next hypothesis. Presumably this artificial inflation would
be difficult to sustain over an extended period because the operating
performance of the firms would not justify the high valuations in the
secondary market. This presumption became stronger after the Journal
published its story detailing the laddering scheme. If the line of

27. Empirical evidence exists that IPOs with a larger first-day return experience greater long-term
underperformance in the first three years after the IPO. SeeJay R. Ritter, The Long-Run PerformanceofInitial
Public Offerings, 46J. FIN. 3 (1991).
28. The differential between the offering price and the secondary market trading price consists oftwo
parts: (a) the underpricing of the offering price below the issuer's fundamental value, and (b) the over-pricing
in the market due to laddering. As discussed in the Introduction, supra, the underpricing is necessary to
compensate initial investors to bear the risk of participating in the laddering scheme. Issuers, on the other
hand, may profit by eliminating the underpricing, thereby bringing the offering price up toward the
fundamental value and obtaining higher offering proceeds.
29. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See Securities
Act Rule 174(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(d) (2004).
30. It is possible that insiders may use such booster shots to sell securities. Most offerings, however,
include a lockup option for insiders that extend on average for 6 months after the IPO. &e infia Table 7.
It is therefore unlikely that benefiting insiders motivated the booster shots on the part of the underwriterinvestment banks.
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reasoning is correct, the sued firms should show lower long-run returns
than their non-sued peers.
Hypothesis 5. Suedfirms will have lower long-run returns measured
from the day after the start of the IPO to the publication of the Wall Street
Journalladderingarticle.
The above hypotheses focus on the impact ofladdering on secondary
market prices. Even ifladdering has some impact on secondary market
prices, whether issuers are culpable remains a separate question. We
develop a number of additional hypotheses to test issuer culpability.
Turning to the principal allegations in the lawsuits, the Section 11
claims shed little light on issuer culpability because issuers are strictly
liable under that provision. The Section 10(b) claims, however, require
more."' In order to establish liability under Section 10(b) the plaintiffs
must show that the issuer-defendants acted with scienter. 32 Moreover,
Section 10(b) claims must survive the heightened pleading requirements
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which
requires plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong
3
inference that the defendant acted" with scienter
The complaints attempt to meet this pleading burden by two means.
First, the suits allege that the issuer-defendants were aware of the laddering conspiracy through the involvement of their executives in the road
shows for their offerings. 4 Actual knowledge, of course, would easily
satisfy the scienter requirement. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the
court concluded that mere participation in the roadshows
was not
35
sufficient to create a strong inference of knowledge.
The complaints, however, also rely on motive as circumstantial evidence of scienter. Motive, of course, is also a relevant factor in assessing
culpability. The plaintiffs allege that the issuer-defendants benefited
from the laddering scheme by using their (inflated) stock as consideration in post-IPO corporate acquisitions, as well as selling more shares to
the public in follow-on offerings after the IPO.36 Here the plaintiffs
fared better, with the court upholding claims against 185 of the 309
issuers. Of these 185 issuers, 156 had done stock-based acquisitions
31. The Section 10(b) claims allow the plaintiffs' lawyers to collect substantially greater damages. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). Section 11 damages are capped at the
offering price. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (2000).
32. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
34. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
35. Id. at 363 n.108, 368.
36. Id. at 320.
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after their IPOs and 29 had follow-on offerings subsequent to their
IPOs.37
The district court, facing motions to dismiss in 309 cases, understandably used broad strokes to prune away what it perceived as weaker
claims. But the motive and opportunity analysis employed is supposed
to distinguish defendants likely to have committed fraud from those
suffering business reverses. Do the mere facts of making an acquisition
or a follow-on offering, neither all that unusual for growing firms, really
provide a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent? The motive-andopportunity inquiry can be sharpened by comparing the sued firms with
a set of matching firms that made IPOs at the same time, but did not
face a laddering-related suit. Were the sued firms more likely to have
made acquisitions or offerings than the firms that avoided litigation?
Hypothesis 6: Post-IPO, sued issuers were more likely to acquire another company
using stock as consideration or issue equity securities in afollow-on offering or both
(providing the issuers with a motive to assist in the ladderingscheme).
Agency costs may affect the issuer's tolerance for market manipulation schemes in the secondary market. As noted above, underpricing is
a clear prerequisite to the laddering scheme. Pricing the offering close
to the market-clearing valuation for the shares will effectively eliminate
the scope for potential manipulation. Absent compensation, institutional investors will not agree to take on the risk of making aftermarket
purchases at inflated share prices, resulting in less underpricing. If
insiders are selling shares as part of the IPO, or venture capitalists are
looking to cash out their investments, it would be reasonable to expect
them to push for the highest possible offering price. Hard bargaining by
these insiders would limit the possibility of a post-offering run up of the
price in the secondary market. By contrast, if the insiders are holding
on to their shares, one would expect them to be more interested in the
highest possible price in the secondao,market, and therefore be in favor
ofladdering schemes. One would expect these insiders to cash out after
the IPO lock-up on their shares expires, typically six months after the
offering.

37. Id at 370-71. One hundred and fourteen issuers prevailed on their motions to dismiss the Section
10(b) claims against them because either no allegation of an acquisition or offering was made against them
(93 issuers), or the allegations failed to specify the number of shares or monetary values involved in the
acquisitions (21 issuers). Id Two issuers escaped because their acquisitions occurred after the close of the
class period and nine issuers were never named as defendants. Se id at 370 n. 126, 371.

2004]

IPO LADDERLVG

Hypothesis 7: Suedfirms will be less likely to have included the shares
of insiders as part of the IPO.
Hypothesis 8: Insiders ofsuedfirms are more likely to have sold shares
after the IPO.
Ifagency costs affect the tolerance of issuers for manipulative schemes
on the part of the underwriters, monitoring devices may be relevant to
the likelihood of fraud. Some studies have found that companies with
weaker monitoring environments are more prone to engage in fraud.38
Weak monitoring may result from less than independent board
structures.
Hypothesis 9: Suedfirms are less likely to have independent board structures.
Finally, culpability of the issuers can also be assessed by looking at
their ex post results. Perhaps the sued firms are simply bad actors. Ex
post measures of issuer culpability include other suits related to the IPO,
suits unrelated to the IPO, and SEC enforcement actions. Similarly,
restatements of financial results may reflect manipulation of accounting
rules to create the appearance of better performance. Issuers who
engage in questionable accounting practices, or who otherwise face
securities fraud suits (related and unrelated to the IPO) and SEC
enforcement actions, may have characteristics (e.g., a willingness to push
the boundaries of legality) that make them more likely to agree to assist
underwriters in engaging in manipulation of the aftermarket through
laddering.
Hypothesis 10: Suedfirms will be more likely to be subject to additionallawsuits
or enforcement actions or both.
Hypothesis 11: Suedftrms will be more likely to restate theirfinancialresults.
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The Web site for the plaintiffs' attorneys in the IPO laddering
litigation has a list of all 309 issuers whose IPOs are the subject of the
38. See, e.g.,Mark S. Beasley, An EmpiricalAnalysis ofthe Relation Betum the Board ofDirertorComposition
and FinancialStatement Fraud,71 ACcT. REV. 443 (1996) (finding that a greater percentage of outside directors
correlates with a lower likelihood offraud, but that a greater number ofdirectorships in other firms correlates
positively with fraud).
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laddering lawsuit.39 To reduce the time needed to hand-collect data, we
selected half of the firms at random. We then excluded financial firms
(SICs 6000-6999),4" foreign firms, spin-offs, and issuers who were not
named as defendants in the laddering litigation. We then selected a
match for each of the remaining issuer-defendants from IPOs coming
to market in 1999 and 2000. Firms sued in the laddeiing litigation were
excluded from the matching sample. Matches were chosen initially
from firms doing IPOs the same year, within the same 3-digit SIC code,
and with offering amounts between 33 % and 3 0 0 % of the sued firm's
offering amount. If no firms met these criteria, we expanded our search
for matches to firms within the same 2-digit SIC code and the other
years of our sample period. Sued firms that could not be matched were
discarded.
These selection procedures left us with 115 sued firms and 115 match
firms. As Table 1 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of both our
sued and match firms are listed on NASDAQ. Not surprisingly, hightech firms (the sector with the heaviest concentration of hot IPOs)
dominate the sample.
Table 1: Sample oflPO Laddering Sued and Matching Firms
Panel A: Sued and Matching Firms by IPO Year
Year of the IPO

Number ofSued Firms

1998
1999
2000
Total

2
63
50
115

Number ofMatching
Firms
0
63
52
115

39. Seehttp://www.iposecuritiesitigation.com/amended.php3 (last visited Aug. 5, 2004). Only the
first three managing underwriters for each offering are tracked. Underwriters who are defendants in the IPO
Laddering litigation are identified from http://www.ipofraud.com (maintained by Melvyn I. Weiss) (last
visited Aug. 5, 2004).
40. SIC stands for "Standard Industrial Classification." The SIC system provides a unified system
to classify companies into industry groupings. For more information on SIC codes see http://www.osha.gov/
pls/imis/sicsearch html,

2004]

IPO L4DDERING

Panel B: Breakdown of Sued and Matching Firms
by Exchange
Exchange

Sued

Percent

Match

Percent

Total

Percent

NASDAQ
NYSE
AMEX
SMCAP
Unknown
Total

113
0
0
0
2
115

98.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.7%
100.0%

107
6
1
1
0
115

93.0%
5.2%
0.9%
0.9%
0.0%
100.0%

220
6
1
1
2
230

95.7%
2.6%
0.4%
0.4%
0.9%
100.0%

Panel C: Sued Firms by SIC Code
SIC 3-Digit
Code

Frequency

Percentage

Computer Programming,
Data Processing, and Other
Computer Related Services

737

58

50.4%

Miscellaneous Business Services

738

12

10.4%

Telephone Communications

481

9

7.8%

Electronic Components And
Accessories

367

6

5.2%

Communications Equipment

366

6

5.2%

Computer And Office Equipment

357

5

4.3%

Drugs

283

4

3.5%

Others

15

13.0%

Total

115

100.0%

Descrption of Industry Group

Hypothesis 1 posits that plaintiffs' attorneys selected issuers for suit
based on their choice of underwriters. The data does not bear out this
prediction. Table 2 compares characteristics relating to the under-
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writers for the two samples. All of the sued firms had an underwriterdefendant as the lead managing underwriter, while 98.3% of the
matched sample had an underwriter-defendant as the lead managing
underwriter as well. We conclude that the issuer defendants in the
laddering litigation have not been named as a result of their choice of
underwriter.

Table 2:,Underwriters
Only thefirst threemanagingunderwritersforeach offeringare tracked Underwriters
who are defendants in the IPO laddering litigation are identified from
www.ipofaud.com (maintainedby Miberg Weiss).

Fraction of issuers with a managing underwriter which is also
a defendant in the IPO laddering litigation

Sued
1.000

Match
0.983

p-value
0.1568

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
Table 3 compares the offering characteristics for the sued and match
firms. The sued firms have an average offering price of $17.50 per
share, significantly greater than the match firm average of$14.60. This
corresponds with a significantly greater market capitalization for the
sued firms, despite the sued firms' smaller assets (although the latter
difference is not statistically significant). Other differences relating to the
offering are insignificant. 4' Overall, Table 3 offers limited support for
Hypothesis 2, which posits that factors related. to potential damage
amounts will be an important determinant of suit.

41. Note that because we select matching firms in part based on closeness in offering amount with
the sued firms, the offering amounts are not statistically different between the sued and matching firm
samples, suggesting that our matching procedure largely succeeded. '
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Table 3: Sued and Match Firms Offering Characteristics
Offer Price
Offer Amount (mill.)
Offered shares as fraction of
outstanding pre-IPO
Offer Amount/Mkt Cap
Fraction of offerings with a
Lockup Option
Market Capitalization (based
on IPO Offer Price) (mill.)
Assets (mill.)

Sued
17.5
95.1
0.810

Match
14.6
94.0
0.641

p-value
0.0001***
0.8855
0.4184

0.211
0.817

0.237
0.887

0.1947
0.1384

618.2

456.9

0.0044***

148.4

181.4

0.1511

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant

at the 10% level.
Table 4 compares the market returns for the two samples following
the IPOs. Not surprisingly, there is substantial evidence to support
Hypothesis 3 (that sued firms will have greater first-day returns). Panel
A shows that sued firms have a mean first-day unadjusted return of
139.15%, while the match firms have returns ofjust 38.48%.42 We find
no support, however, for Hypothesis 4 (based on the plaintiffs "booster
shot" allegation) that predicts that sued firms will have greater returns
immediately after the expiration of the quiet period. Panel B shows that
the sued firms had a mean adjusted return of- 1.4 8 % for the two-day
period after the end of the quiet period for the IPO. The match firms
by contrast had -1.00% adjusted return for the same period.4" This evi-

dence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that underwriters employed a
"booster shot" for laddering IPO securities--allowing the initial institutional investors to sell out at an eventual profit, and shifting the eventual
loss from the overinflated shares onto unsuspecting retail consumers.
Recall that Hypothesis 5 postulated that the sued firms would have
lower long-run returns after the IPO. The data in Panel C of Table 4
42. We use unadjusted first-day returns because investors, the press, and plaintiffs' attorneys generally
focus on the raw price increase on the first day of an IPO.
43. Returns were adjusted based on the Center for Research in Security Prices's (CRSP)
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX market index. This may result in a bias in our adjusted returns if the NASDAQ
returns do not closely track the CRSP index. As we use the same index for both the sued and match sample,
however, and both samples are overwhelmingly listed on the NASDAQ there is little chance that our choice
of index will bias our results.
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(Adjusted Return from the Closing Price on the IPO Date to December
6, 2000) provides little support for Hypothesis 5. Sued firms had a
greater mean adjusted long-term return of -26.00%, compared with an
adjusted long-term return of - 4 3 .6 1% for matching firms. On the other
hand, sued firms had a lower median adjusted long-term return equal to
-74.00%, compared with -68.18% for matching firms. Neither difference is statistically significant.
Finally, Table 4 also demonstrates that the sued firms have greater
share turnover (see Panel D), a finding consistent with Hypothesis 2 (that
sued firms will have characteristics leading to greater potential calculated damages at trial). The differences between the two samples, while
statistically significant at both the mean and the median, are relatively
modest.
Table 4: Aftermarket Performance
Panel A: First-Day Post-IPO Unadjusted Return
The first-yearpost-IPO unadjusted return is defined as the difference between the
closing price on the first day of aftermarket tradingpost-IPO and the IPO price
divided by the IPO price.
n

25%

Median

75%

Mean

Suit

114

0.7040

1.2000

1.8571

1.3915

Match

113

0.0000

0.1572

0.4873

0.3848

t-test of difference in means = -8.3217 (p=0.0000)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test z-statistic = -8.906 (p=0.0000)
Panel B: Adjusted Return From End of Quiet Period to 2
Days After End of Quiet Period
Adjusted return is adjusted based on the CRSPJTSE/AMEX/NASDA Qmarket
index return.
n

25%

Median

75%

Mean

Suit

115

-0.0765

-0.0323

0.0299

-0.0148

Match

115

-0.0669

-0.0178

0.0322

-0.0100

t-test of difference in means = 0.360 (p=0. 7 191)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test z-statistic = 0.788 (p=0.4 3 0 8 )
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Panel C: Adjusted Return From the Closing Price on the IPO
Date to December 6, 2000
Adjusted return is adjusted based on the CRSP.ATSE/AMEX/NASDA Qmarket
index return.
n

25%

Median

75%

Mean

Suit

112

-0.9200

-0.7400

-0.4212

-0.2600

Match

99

-0.9407

-0.6818

-0.1874

-0.4361

t-test of difference in means = -0.858 (p=0.3919)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test z-statistic = 0.340 (p=0.7 3 39)
Panel D: First-Year Turnover
The first-year turnover is calculatedfor the first year after the IPO for allfirms
(except those where an IPO ladderingsuit isfiled within thefirstyear ofthe IPO) as
follows. I - (1 -TuM)2 52,. where Turn is average daily tradingvolume divided by
the number of shares outstanding and 252 is the average number of tradingdaysfor
the IPOfirms in the samplefor thefirstyear after the IPO.
N

25%

Median

75%

Mean

Sued

110

0.8712

0.9528

0.9937

0.9149

Match

115

0.7679

0.8949

0.9651

0.8490

t-test of difference in means = -3.8053 (p=0.0002)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test z-statistic = -4.054 (p=0.000 1)
In summary, we find only weak evidence of any impact from IPO laddering. The strongest evidence comes from the first-day returns: sued
firms had a significantly larger first-day return as compared to matching
firms. Even here, an alternative hypothesis is possible: plaintiffs'
attorneys simply may have "cherry-picked" those firms that happened
to enjoy the largest first-day post-IPO return as defendants. Such firms
and associated underwriters may look "suspicious" to juries even if no
real fraud occurred. We nonetheless start from the presumption that
laddering did elevate post-IPO stock prices and that the underwriters in
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fact were culpable. This presumption is bolstered by the very substantial
settlements resulting from the SEC investigation of laddering. 4
We focus more directly on the culpability of issuers under Hypotheses
6 through 11. Do sued firms take advantage of the run-up produced by
the laddering to sell shares in follow-on offerings, as suggested by
Hypothesis 6? Table 5 shows that the sued firms are almost twice as
likely to have undertaken a follow-on offering during the class period
(27.8% of the sued firms, as compared to 14 .8 % of the match firms).
They also are more likely to have done a stock-based acquisition,
although the difference here is not statistically significant. We interpret
these findings as limited support for the motive allegations in the
plaintiffs' complaint, which the district court credited across the board.
Of course, there remains a difficult issue of causation. All else being
equal, one would expect a firm that has experienced substantial stock
price gains to favor raising capital by selling stock-from the firm's
perspective, equity looks cheap compared to debt.
Table 5: Follow-On Equity Offerings and Acquisitions
(to 12/6/2000)

Follow-on Equity Offering
Mean Follow-on Equity
Offering Amt (Mill).
Post-IPO Acquisition
Post-IPO Acquisition Amt
(Mill).

Sued

Match

p-value

0.2783
364.5

0.1478
272.1

0.0156**
0.3897

0.1150
1098.7

0.0783
1074.5

0.3491
0.9806

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
*** significant at the 1%level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant
at the 10% level.
Turning to the question of sales by insiders as part of the IPO, Table
6 supports the prediction of Hypothesis 7 that insiders of the sued firms
will be less likely to have sold shares as part of the IPO. The match
firms are nearly three times as likely to have included secondary offerings in their IPOs, consistent with the view that insiders selling shares as
part of the IPOs will oppose underpricing and thereby make it difficult

44. For information regarding some of these settlements, see supra note 8.
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for underwriters to compensate investors to engage in laddering.
Moreover, the number of shares sold and the percentage of the overall
number offered both are greater for the match firms. The insiders of the
matched firms sell more, despite the fact that their percentage of shareholdings pre-IPO is roughly the same as the insiders of the sued firms.
As a result, the insiders of the match firms end up with a smaller percentage post-IPO, although they still own a substantial 45% (compared
to the 50% held by the sued firm insiders).
Table 6: Sales of Secondary Shares in the IPO

Presence of a secondary
share offering in the IPO
Amount of secondary share
sales (mill)
Amount of secondary share
sales as fraction of total offering amount
Insider ownership of shares
as fraction of outstanding
shares pre-IPO
Insider ownership of shares
as fraction of outstanding
shares post-IPO

p-value

Sued
Sample
Mean
0.0782

Match
Sample
Mean
0.2087

0.0046***

1.4281

6.3809

0.0 198**

0.0109

0.1125

0.0615*

0.6077

0.5777

0.3913

0.5032

0.4467

0.0482**

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant
at the 10% level.
Table 7 provides evidence related to whether insiders use laddering
to assist in post-IPO sales of shares in the secondary market. Little
difference exists in the prevalence of lock-up provisions for insiders8 8 .7 % of the match firms and 8 3 . 2 % of the sued firms have lock-up
provisions.45 The mean lock-up time for sued and match firms was

45. Lock-up provisions are contractual agreements under which insiders of a company going public
agree not to sell their shares in the company for a period of time after the offering.
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approximately 6 months. Unless laddering worked to elevate share
prices for a period greater than 6 months after the offering (unlikely for
shares trading in relatively efficient markets), it is unlikely that insiders
used laddering to facilitate insider sales. As a measure for the post-IPO
sales by insiders of shares, we looked at the percentage point change in
insider ownership (for directors and officers) from immediately after the
IPO to the first available proxy statement after the IPO (on average 531
days after the IPO). Table 7 shows that insiders of sued firms reduced
their ownership by 16.65 percentage points from after the IPO to the
first proxy statement." In contrast, insiders at the matching firms
reduced their ownership by only 9.64 percentage points (difference
significant at the 10% level). At a summary statistic level, this difference
in ownership change supports Hypothesis 8 that insiders profited from
the laddering through elevated sales of their own shares after the IPO.
Because of the extended period of time on average between the first
proxy statement and the IPO date, however, our measure of insider
sales is overinclusive of sales for which the IPO laddering may have
worked to elevate prices.
Table 7: Post-IPO Insider Sale of Shares

Fraction with a Lock-up Provision
Number of Lock-up Days
Percentage Point Change in
Insider Ownership Post-IPO

_

Sued

Match

p-value

0.8319

0.8870

0.2329

176.2
-16.65

176.5
-9.64

0.9187
0.0006***

_

I

I

_

I

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant
at the 10% level.
Table 8 measures corporate governance schemes at the time IPOs
were offered. Hypothesis 9 predicts that the sued firms are less likely to
have independent board structures. We find no support for Hypothesis
9 in the data. Indeed, the sued firms seem to have generally more independent board structures than the match firms. Specifically, the sued

46. The percentage point decline in insider ownership is defined as the difference (in percentage
points) between the ownership percentage immediately after the IPO and the ownership percentage at the
time of the first proxy statement after the IPO.

2004]

IPO LADDERIG

firms have a greater percentage of outside directors on their boards, are
more likely to separate the chair and CEO roles, and are more likely to
have an independent audit committee. We find additional evidence of
higher quality external monitoring: sued firms are also more likely to
have a Big 5 auditor (although this difference is only weakly significant)
and have a higher average number of block shareholders (defined as
greater than 10% of the shares). The data also shows that sued firms are
more likely to be associated with a venture capitalist.
Table 8: Corporate Governance at the time of the IPO
All corporategovernance variables are measured immediately after the IPO. A grey
directoris defined as an outside directorwho is: (a) afounder of the company; (b) a
consultantor a person with some other non-director-relatedbusiness relationshipwith
the issuer; (c) affiliated with the underwriterfor the issuer; (d) affiliated with the
zssuer's lawfirm; (e) aformer employee of the issuer; 0 a relative of a top officer of
the issuer;or (g)an affiliate ofa large block shareholder(definedas greaterthan 30%
ownership of the votes) of the issuer.

Percent independent (nongrey) directors
Classified board
Number of directors
Separate CEO/chairman
External board seats held by
independent directors
Directors on audit committee
Independent audit committee
Big 5 Accounting Firm
Venture Capitalist
Number of 10% block
owners (post-IPO)
Percent held by largest shareholder (post-IPO)
CEO is the largest
shareholder (post-IPO)

Sued
Sample
Mean
0.5550

Match
Sample
Mean
0.4897

p-value

0.0139**

0.7391
7.0174
0.4957
7.3391

0.7043
7.0696
0.3652
8.0783

0.5582
0.8952
0.0460**
0.3674

2.5909
0.6000
1.000
0.779
2.1130

2.6354
0.4522
0.974
0.626
1.7391

0.5839
0.0248**
0.0846*
0.01 16**
0.0 129**

0.2648

0.2764

0.6252

0.1652

0.1826

0.7293
I I

The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in means
between the sued and match firm samples.
***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant
at the 10% level.
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Turning to ex post indicia of culpability, Table 9 illustrates that the
match firms are more likely to have been sued for fraud related and
unrelated to the IPO, although the difference is not statistically
significant. There is no difference in the incidence of SEC enforcement
actions, of which there is a negligible number for both samples. These
findings do not support Hypothesis 10 (sued firms will be more likely to
be named as defendants in additional lawsuits). We do find some
support for Hypothesis 11: sued firms are more likely to restate their
results, although the overall percentage is not that high (14%). Overall,
Table 9 provides little evidence of issuer culpability for the laddering
suits.
Table 9: Other Fraud Lawsuits Against the Issuers
OtherSuits are defined as suits with non-IPOladderingrelatedsecuritiesfraudclaims
filed against the issuer at any pointfrom the time of the IPOto November 30, 2003
(the date we stopped collecting data in preparationfor the 2004 Corporate Law
Symposium at the University of Cincinnati College of Law). Other IPO Suits are
defined as other suits where the fraud claim relates to the IPO. SEC enforcement
actions are those brought by the SEC againstthe issuer at any pointfrom the time of
the IPO to November 30, 2003. Restatements are accounting restatementsfor the
issuerat any point in the periodfrom the IPO to November 30, 2003.

Other Suits
Other IPO
Suits
SEC
Enforcement
Restatements

Total Number
Sued
Firms
115
17
115
5
I
114
2
115

16

Percent

14.8%
4.4%
1.8%
13.9%

Total Number
Match
Firms
115
21
115
11
I
115
2
115

4

Percent

18.3%
9.6%
1.7%
3.5%

t-stat of difference between mean Other Suits = 0.708 (p = 0.4797)
t-stat of difference between mean Other Suits Related to the IPO =
1.557 (p= 0.1210)
t-stat of difference between mean SEC Enforcement Actions = 0.0088
(p=0.9930)
t-stat of difference between mean Restatements = -2.845 (p=0.00 4 8)
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IV.

MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS

To provide a more comprehensive picture of the decision of the
plaintiffs' lawyers to file suit against these issuers, we construct a series
of logit models using the variables discussed above as our independent
variables. The dependent variable for these regressions is the incidence
of the suit (with 1 for an issuer facing laddering suit and 0 for an issuer
without a laddering suit). We present the results in Table 10.
Table 10: Logit Model of the Decision to File an IPO
Laddering Suit
Independent Variable
Constant
IPO Offer Price
Log (Market Capitalization)
Log (Adj. Return from
Close of IPO Date to
Dec. 6, 2000)
First Year Post-IPO
Turnover
First-Day Post-IPO
Unadjusted Return
Adjusted Return from End of
Quiet Period to 2 days after
End
Follow-On Equity Offering
(to 12/6/2000)
Post-IPO Acquisition
Percentage Point Change in
Insider Ownership
Post-IPO
Separate CEO/Chair
Percent independent (nongrey) directors
Audit committee
independence

Model 1
-6.160*
(-1.930)
-0.014
(-0.240)
0.351
(0.900)
0.014
(0.090)

Model 2
-7.040*
(-1.900)
0.027
(0.440)
0.334
(0.730)
0.023
(0.130)

Model 3
-7.835***
(-2.140)
0.033
(0.530)
0.378
(0.850)
0.032
(0.180)

3.384*
(1.710)
1.954***
(4.570)
0.070
(0.030)

3.481
(1.480)
2.065***
(4.310)
0.625
(0.270)

4.215
(1.810)
1.765***
(3.930)
0.841
(0.380)

0.054
(0.090)
0.410
(0.540)
-1.366
(-0.890)

0.208
(0.310)
0.221
(0.260)
-0.409
(-0.250)

0.297
(0.460)
0.717
(0.820)
-0.663
(-0.410)

0.628
(1.350)
-1.682
(-1.180)
0.713
F (1.300)

0.732
(1.580)
-1.782
(-1.260)
0.463
(0.830)
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0.588
(1.080)
0.239

0.730
(1.330)
0.191

(0.980)
-6.964**
(-2.190)

(0.810)
-6.387**
(-2.050)

offering amount

Other IPO Suit

-3.993***
(-2.970)
1.927**

Restatement

(1.990)
-2.047***

Other Suit

N
Pseudo Adj. R2
Log Likelihood

161
0.324
-74.669

161
0.424
-63.673

(-2.670)
161
0.412
-64.933

*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant

at the 10% level.
Model 1 focuses on market factors as follows:
IPO Offer Price + P2Log(Market Cap.) +
Lawsuit= a +
P3 Log(Ad'. Return from Close of IPO Date to Dec. 6,
2000) + 4First-Year post-IPO Turnover + P5First-Day
Post-IPO Unadj. Return+ P6Adj. Return from End of
Quiet Period to 2 Days after End + 0 Follow-On Equity
Offering+ P,8Post-IPO Acquisition + I39Percentage Point
Change in Insider Ownership Post IPO + E
As reported in Table 10, First-rear Post-IPO Turnover is weakly
significant in Model 1, but our other "damages" variables (Log(Market
Capitalization)and Log(Adj. Returnfrom Close of lPO Date to Dec. 6, 2000))
are insignificant. We interpret these results as offering little or no
support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that sued firms would offer
greater potential damages.
First-dayPost-IPO UnadjustedReturn, however, is strongly significant (as
it is in the remainder of our models). We conclude that the data
strongly supports Hypothesis 3, that the issuers were selected as
defendants based on first-day returns. Our variables relating to the
stock market return around the expiration of the quiet period are
insignificant (as they are for the remainder of the models), thus lending
no support to Hypothesis 4, which posited that "booster shots" may
have influenced the selection of defendants.
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We also include indicator variables for post-IPO acquisitions and
follow-on equity offerings in Model 1 to capture the issuers' motives for
conspiring in the laddering scheme alleged by the plaintiffs. Both the
Post-IPOAcquisitionand Follow-on Equity Offeringvariablesare insignificant
in this model and remain insignificant in our other models as well. This
study concludes that there is little support for Hypothesis 6 (that sued
firms were more likely to engage in acquisitions or follow-on offerings
after the IPO) in our data. Lastly, we include a variable for the Percentage
Changein Insider OwnershipPost-IPOto measure insider sales after the IPO.
Unlike the summary statistics reported above in Table 7, we find no
evidence that higher insider sales are related to a higher probability of
facing a lawsuit in the IPO laddering litigation. The coefficient on the
Percentage Change in Insider Ownership Post-IPO variable is statistically
insignificant in Model 1 (as well as in the other models).
Model 2 adds variables that are more closely related to monitoring,
including corporate governance variables as follows:
Lawsuit = Model I Variables + ),6 Separate CEO/Chair+ /iPercent
independent (non-grey) directors+ /,,Audit Committee Independence
+/J,13Venture Capitalist + /,Alumber of 10% Block Owners (after
the IPO) + ,6.,Amount of Seconday Share Sales as Fraction
of Total Offering Amount in the IPO + /JnOtherIPO Suits + e
The governance variables are generally insignificant, except for the
separation of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, which correlates
with the incidence of suit (the opposite of the predicted direction). Thus,
Hypothesis 9, relating to board independence, finds no support here.47
On the other hand, our measure for potential agency costs relating to
underpricing-the percentage of secondary shares sold in the IPO-is
negatively correlated with suit. The more secondary shares (e.g., shares
in the hands of directors, officers, and other pre-IPO shareholders) sold
in the offering, the less likely the firm is to face a laddering suit. This
supports Hypothesis 7 (that sued firms are less likely to have a secondary
offering as part of the IPO). Firms are less likely to tolerate excessive
underpricing (to the benefit of the underwriters), if directors, officers,
and other shareholders directly bear the cost when they sell shares in the
IPO.
We also include variables relating to expost issuer culpability in Model
2. The presence of another suit relating to the IPO (Other IPO Suit) is
negatively correlated with being named as a defendant in the laddering

47. As a check for robustness, we re-estimated each of the models with just one of the governance
variables (rather than all of them together in the model). We found similar results-the only significant
variable was the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board.
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litigation. This result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 10 that sued firms
will be more culpable as measured by other bad acts leading to lawsuits
related to the IPO. However, the negative correlation may also reflect
awareness by plaintiffs' lawyers that multiple suits could quickly exhaust
the limits of insurance coverage rather than any lack of culpability on
the part of the laddering defendant issuers.
Model 3 removes the indicator variable for OtherlPOSuit and replaces
it with more general variables intended to capture whether the issuer
has a propensity for fraud as follows:
Lawsuit = Model I Variables + /JoSeparate CEO/Chair+ /JPercent
independent (non-grey) directors + A-.Audit Committee Independence
+ 3Venture Capitalist+ /3Numberof 10% Block Owners (after
the IPO) + 6hmount of Seconday Share Sales as Fraction
of Total Offering Amount in the IPO + J16Restatement + /,8,Other
Suit + E
The variables include securities fraud litigation, whether or not
related to the IPO (Other Suit) and accounting restatements (Restatement).
The Other Suit variable is also negatively correlated with suit, but the
Restatement variable is positively correlated. This latter result, while
supporting Hypothesis 11 (that sued firms are more likely to restate their
financial results), is somewhat surprising, given our other findings
relating to issuer culpability. Not all restatements are necessarily alike
or demonstrate wrongdoing on the part of the issuer. Moreover, it may
be that plaintiffs' attorneys are selecting firms with a restatement (a
visible, if somewhat noisy, indicia of fraud by the issuer) as a target in
the laddering litigation. Perhaps the presence of a restatement casts
doubt on the credibility of the issuer-defendant, notwithstanding the fact
that the misrepresentations at issue in the laddering litigation had
nothing to do with the firm's financial statements. The lack of other
suits based on non-laddering fraud claims, however, provides evidence
that the laddering issuer-defendants (despite the higher fraction of
restatements) are not engaged in sufficiently egregious conduct to
warrant significantly higher numbers of other suits compared with the
matching firms.
Overall, our logistic regression offers little support to the notion of
issuer culpability in the laddering suits. The market return for the first
day after the IPO is strongly significant and correlated with suit in all
specifications, while the presence of secondary sales of shares held by
insiders as part of the IPO is negatively correlated with suit. These facts
are consistent with the plaintiffs' story that the issuers were complicit in
the laddering scheme. They are equally consistent, however, with an
agency cost bargaining story, in which the issuers are victims of the

2004]

IPO LDDERLIVG

205

insiders and underwriters, not culprits. Our other variables intended to
capture issuer culpability are generally insignificant or the opposite of
the predicted direction.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

We provide evidence that casts doubt on the culpability of issuers for
the efforts of underwriters to manipulate the IPO aftermarket through
laddering agreements with favored investor-customers. When directors,
officers, and other pre-IPO shareholders sell secondary shares as part of
the IPO, evidence exists that the issuer will resist underpricing and
laddering schemes because such schemes reduce the proceeds for the
secondary offering, as well as for the firm. Nonetheless, in our multivariate logit model, no evidence exists that issuers benefit from laddering
either through the use of elevated share prices in post-IPO acquisitions
or through follow-on equity offerings after the IPO. Moreover, sued
firms are much less likely to face a fraud lawsuit (whether related to the
IPO or not) than the matching firms, indicating that factors that may
make a firm more prone to engaging in questionable behavior are less
prevalent among the sued firms.
Of course, our findings are only as robust as the quality of our proxies
for issuer culpability. While the proxies do not capture the "state of
mind" of the issuers (indeed, such a proxy probably does not exist), they
correlate with both the potential motive on the part of issuers to engage
in laddering as well as characteristics within the issuer that may make
the issuer more prone to engage in fraud. The plaintiffs' attorneys
stressed post-IPO acquisitions and follow-on equity offerings as indicia
of an issuer's culpability in their complaints against the IPO laddering
issuers. Indeed, only these lOb-5 claims survived the issuers' motion to
dismiss (although the § 11 claims survived for all of the firms).
Forcing issuers to bear responsibility for the wrongdoing of underwriters when the issuers are not necessarily culpable (and themselves
may have been harmed through excessive underpricing) may make
sense if the issuers are the best source of insurance for retail investors
who end up with the inflated shares and experience systematic losses.
But the issuers at the IPO stage are not repeat-players. Consequently,
the firms are in no better position than many investors to spread the risk
of loss from mispriced shares. Moreover, to the extent the issuers often
are at an informational disadvantage relative to the underwriters, the
issuers are not in a position to monitor or deter aftermarket manipulation on the part of the underwriters. In such a situation, imposing
liability on issuers for the underwriters' bad conduct without any form
of due diligence defense simply raises costs for issuers contemplating an
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initial public offering without any corresponding social benefits in the
form of enhanced deterrence.
Section 11 contemplates a due diligence defense when third parties,
such as underwriters and auditors, are held responsible for wrongdoings
on the part of the issuer in a public offering.48 Our Article suggests that
issuers should, at the very least, enjoy a corresponding due diligence
defense when forced to bear responsibility for the wrongdoings of
underwriters and other third parties. Under such a defense, the issuer's
culpability would turn on the corporate insider's knowledge or care in
uncovering information about the underwriters' wrongdoings (as
imputed to the issuer). If the insiders are not implicated in the scheme,
the issuer would likely be able to establish its due diligence.
The issuer (particularly for IPOs) often is not in a good position to
police the actions of underwriters. Issuers often are not repeat players
and lack the expertise to monitor underwriters. Further, agency problems may affect the knowledge and care corporate insiders take on
behalf of the issuer. To the extent insiders desire to line their own
pockets through expected later sales at elevated prices in the secondary
market, the insiders may acquiesce to the laddering scheme at the
expense of the issuer. An argument exists therefore that the issuer
should enjoy even a greater defense against Section 11 claims where the
primary wrongdoer is a third party whenever the issuer does not directly
benefit from the fraud. A broader defense would shield issuers who do
not engage in a post-IPO offering of shares or acquisition from Section
11 claims primarily made against the underwriters in the laddering
cases. This defense could be invoked even when insiders have knowledge (or with reasonable care should have knowledge) of the laddering
scheme. Under either a due diligence defense or a more comprehensive
defense, issuers obtain at least partial protection from Section 11 liability
where the issuer is not culpable for the wrongs of third parties.

48. Full symmetry might require that underwriters be strictly liable for misrepresentations in the
registration statement concerning the distribution process. We take no position on this possibility.

